
Image Credit: NY Times
In the United States, talk of the rise of militancy in Pakistan has become synonymous with fears that the country’s nuclear arsenal will fall into the wrong hands. Recent articles and books, particularly from the NY Times, have further probed this topic, leading many to question just how much control Pakistan has over its nuclear weapons. Heather Williams, based in Washington, D.C., seeks to address these questions, and dispel many notions associated with the issue:
A May 4 New York Times article by David E. Sanger, “Strife in Pakistan Raises U.S. Doubts Over Nuclear Arms” sounded the alarm on the security of Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal just prior to President Zardari’s visit to Washington. By contrast, U.S. officials continue to express confidence in Pakistan’s leadership, and President Zardari said in a recent interview with Wolf Blitzer that Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal was “definitely safe.” So where is the NY Times getting this story from? What is the status of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities? The facts about Pakistan’s security structure reveal the threat is overblown and there is no red button on Zardari’s desk waiting to be pressed by some sneaky scientist or tribal leader in the event he reaches Islamabad.
According to Sanger, the Obama administration is “increasingly concerned about new vulnerabilities to Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal.” Unidentified administration officials complain the U.S. wants information on three areas of concern:
- Location of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons
- Physical security of nuclear facilities
- Implementation of US assistance
It is difficult to navigate some of the assertions in the Times article, along with similar pieces from the Miami Herald and Fox News that jumped on the Pakistan bashing bandwagon. But despite complaints about a lack of transparency, the U.S. actually knows a great deal about Pakistan’s nuclear security. Pakistan has between 60 and 100 nuclear weapons. Immediately following the September 11th attacks, President Musharraf moved the nuclear weapons to six new underground locations. Most of these are south of Islamabad in Punjab province.
The assumption that the U.S. would know the exact location of Pakistan’s nuclear facilities is incongruous, since states are not compelled to share such sensitive information. In response to a question from David Gregory on Meet the Press on this topic, President Zardari retorted, “Why don’t you do the same with other countries yourself?… We have a right to our own sovereignty.”
Pakistan must play a balancing act of relying on U.S. assistance while maintaining its inherent distrust of U.S. intentions, particularly on nuclear issues. For example, the U.S. offered to help Pakistan develop a unique dual-key system for its launch codes, however Pakistan rebuffed the offer out of the fear the U.S. would sabotage its weapons in the process. Current fears run in a similar vein. Islamabad is reluctant to tell the U.S. the location of its nuclear weapons for fear the U.S. or India will strike those locations to eliminate Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent capabilities. The U.S. does know the nuclear weapons are in secure facilities nowhere near the areas of fighting in FATA and NWFP.
Concerns about physical and personnel security are also exaggerated. In a 2008 BBC interview, Brigadier Shaukat Qadir, a Pakistani nuclear expert, said “Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are only as much at risk as those of the U.S. or India.” Pakistan’s weapons are disassembled (the weapon itself is separate from the detonators which are all separate from delivery systems such as missiles) and cannot be used by anyone other than the Pakistani government because of command and control security measures.
Sanger suggests that rogue scientists will supply militants with nuclear materials. This is highly unlikely. Also, the militants have different objectives than terrorist groups and are not as interested in acquiring a nuclear weapon. In breaking up the A.Q. Khan network, the U.S. and Pakistan jointly identified and removed questionable scientists and implemented a strict screening process. Security personnel are trained in the U.S. Also, the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA] Illicit Trafficking Database has never reported a security incident in Pakistan.
Through various forms of assistance, the U.S. has helped Pakistan secure its nuclear facilities, including a $100 million program launched under President Bush. In 2000, President Clinton created a joint U.S.-Pakistan commission to develop Pakistan’s command and control system. In the process, the U.S. had insights into Pakistan’s nuclear infrastructure. Along with financial assistance, the U.S. also made secret agreements to station U.S. personnel in Pakistan solely to guarantee the safety of the nuclear weapons.
Yet Pakistan’s security and future remain questionable to many Americans. The Obama administration must play a delicate balance in expressing concern for the security situation while not subsequently questioning the Zardari government’s sovereignty or ability to lead. The administration has been consistent in its message: general concern about Pakistan, but confidence in the security of its nuclear arsenal. According to National Security Advisor James Jones, Pakistan’s efforts to secure its nuclear weapons “are moving in a more positive direction,” but if the situation quickly disintegrates “obviously the nuclear question comes into view.”

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Kalsoom,
Have a look at this ToI article…
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India-thinks-Pak-N-sites-already-in-radical-hands-Report/articleshow/4537037.cms
As a hack I’d say there’s almost no grist to this peice – apart from the fact that some apparently well informed Israeli rag says the Pak N weapons are lost to dodgy types…
Or rather, sorry, an Israeli journal had discussed that Indian diplomats and US equivalents had discussed Pak nukes being lost.
I think you are very right to point out that Pakistan’s nukes are safe (the fact that they are disassembled in to so many different parts gives a lot of piece of mind).
However, all of this clamoring amongst American media about Pakistani nukes does nothing to assuage Pakistani’s about American intentions–even if the administration is towing a different line (people always blur the line between what the US media and the government say about foreign relations).
I think a good question to ask is WHY is there such a discrepancy – i.e. David Sanger of the NY Times obviously has access to high-level contacts within the administration, DOD, etc. – so if the administration has confidence in the safety of our nuclear arsenal, why doesn’t THAT story also play into the press?
Every Allah Data and his kids know that Pakistan poses no nuclear threat. Those who sings songs of a nuclear holocaust coming from South Asia are so wrong. India has the same amount of control over its nuclear weapons that Pakistan has.
Seriously, they should shut up with the Pakistan-bashing. I’m feeling a RafayKashmiri moment coming up. And I think I should stop.
I think a point should be made when it comes to other countries, especially the ones you mentioned i.e. USA/india, striking Pakistan’s nuclear facilities. The whole paranoia that Pakistan’s nuclear facilities would be attacked by another power, if there locations were made known, is also exaggerated.
What would this accomplish? This would be an extremely short-sighted action as the knowledge and infrastructure to develop more nuclear weapons would remain. If you bomb an arms market in darra (in pak’s tribal area where foreign weapons are copied by hand) you would get rid of the weapons there but you would not erase the knowledge and the infrastructure in place to develop more. Basically, it would make no sense to bomb the nuclear facilities as the knowledge, expertise and infrastructure to build another weapon would remain. Would they then go after A.Q. Khan and everyone he has trained in Pakistan? I think not.
Shaheryar, I would agree with you but only partly. I do think that this whole nuclear bombing threat is false. It would require an enormous action to do that, and enormous in manpower used, technology needed and the weapons that would be used.
But by destroying a nuclear facility, it might not erase the knowledge and expertise but it’s enough to set a program back by many years. Islrael hopes to do that with Tehran and South Korea with Pyongyang.
So if they do end up bombing Kahuta, trust me…we would suffer tremendous losses but yes, not everything will be lost.
http://www.csmonitor.com/2009/0515/p06s11-wosc.html
Pervez Hoodbhoy doesn’t seem to be helping, though his concern is more the radicalization of personnel than a Taliban takeover scenario.
Yawar, yeah I can understand that. It definitely would be a loss, both physically and symbolically. I think a strike on Iran or North Korea is more damging as their programs are in ifancy right now. But point taken, it would still be a tremendous loss and would require Pakistan to start from square one, incurring huge financial burdens.
Very timely update to this story on NY Times today: http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/18/world/asia/18nuke.html?_r=1&hp
This time Sanger of diverting US assistance for securing nuclear weapons towards the production of fissile material. In the same CNN interview cited above, however, Zardari says that his country is not producing any new fissile material. This raises 2 flaming red flags for me.
1. Sanger has dug himself into an ideological hole he can’t get out of and is convinced Pakistan’s nuclear weapons will be jeopardized one way or the other
2. There is another example of the disconnect between Zardari and the military/nuclear establishment.
Thanks Heather!
I actually woke up and saw that article and immediately thought of this post and what your thoughts would be on it.
Question, what do you think about what Bruce Reidel said in the article?
Bruce Riedel, the Brookings Institution scholar who served as the co-author of Mr. Obama’s review of Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy, reflected the administration’s concern in a recent interview, saying that Pakistan “has more terrorists per square mile than anyplace else on earth, and it has a nuclear weapons program that is growing faster than anyplace else on earth.”
Considering that Riedel was the main architect behind Obama’s AfPak strategy how do you think such views will translate?
I would listen to Bruce Riedel before Sanger. The thinking behind his point goes: Pakistan is a very scary place to Americans because it has a lot of “terrorists;” terrorists have expressed a desire to have a nuclear weapons; Pakistan has nuclear weapons; eventually terrorists will get one of those weapons… or so the logic goes. But Riedel’s statement hinges on how we define terrorists. In Pakistan, are they militants, insurgents, tribal bands, or terrorists? What are their political objectives? To my understanding they are not one in the same as al Qaeda, and acquiring a nuclear bomb isn’t necessarily in their interest. But the social and cultural nuances of Pakistan are incredibly foreign to Americans, so it is just easier to label them all terrorists. (Not that I would be so bold as to contradict Bruce Riedel, of course)
I think another American misperception in the above strain of logic is that Pakistan’s nuclear weapons are up for grabs. Pakistan has far more interest in keeping its nuclear weapons safe than anybody else. Namely because if terrorists/insurgents do acquire a weapon, they will not also acquire a missile. So the only place for that bomb to go off is in Pakistan since getting it across a border is just as difficult (if not more so) than acquiring one. But again, from an American perspective, it doesn’t seem the Pakistani government has its act together so how are we to know they are securing their weapons?
Riedel makes a great point elsewhere in the article about fissile material. As I said in the original post, Pakistan’s bombs are all dismantled. Putting the 3 parts together is nearly impossible. But acquiring one of those parts (the fissile material) is less difficult, and with the porous borders it would be easy to transport.
I think Riedel’s points will translate into the AfPak strategy with a strong push for the Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty, increased border security (which requires stability and a strong police force in Afghanistan and Pakistan), and increased pressure/oversight of the IAEA.
V interesting, esp re: the Fissile Material Cut Off Treaty = what would that entail?
Also wanted to highlight this piece I saw today in BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/8052587.stm
“Pakistan in French Nuclear Deal” – France and Pakistan have agreed to co-operate on civilian nuclear power, officials said, with Islamabad calling the move a “significant development”.
But there is confusion over the deal reached by French President Nicolas Sarkozy and his Pakistani counterpart.
Pakistani officials said Mr Sarkozy had undertaken to supply Pakistan with “civilian nuclear technology”.
But the Elysee Palace said France had agreed only to co-operate in the field of “nuclear safety”.
Another day, another article on why we SHOULD worry about Pakistan’s nukes: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4932
This is the kicker: “As Pakistan becomes engulfed in chaos, there is a real chance that its nuclear weapons will fall into the hands of extremists determined to kill as many Americans as they can. Although the public has yet to pay much attention to what is happening in Pakistan and there is nowhere near the level of hysteria that gripped the United States nearly 50 years ago, the prospect of a nuclear weapon from Pakistan exploding on American soil is much higher than a Soviet attack from Cuba ever was.”
If that doesn’t inspire some fear, I don’t know what will. Geez.
well pakistan is enjoying robust command and control network compare to india and to get nuclear arsenals is not i kids game . Pakistan army is waking and fighting ruthlessly . to get a bomb with knowng how to operate is not a terrorists job …. as pakistan weapons are not assemble .