
AP Image: Qari Zainuddin with his bodyguards earlier this month
On Tuesday, media outlets reported that Taliban commander Qari Zainuddin was shot dead in Dera Ismail Khan. According to the NY Times, “The initial investigation indicated that the gunman was a guard named Gulbadin Mehsud who was thought to have been loyal to Mr. Zainuddin.” Dawn, in its coverage, noted the attacker entered the compound after morning prayers “and opened indiscriminate fire when they were asleep, killing Zainuddin on the spot.” The alleged attacker escaped after the attack, which also wounded another guard.
News agencies primarily framed the incident in light of Tehreek-e-Taliban head Baitullah Mehsud, noting Zainuddin was considered his “chief rival.” Al Jazeera quoted one of Zainuddin’s aides, Baz Mohammed, who vowed to avenge his death, asserting, “It was definitely Baitullah’s man who infiltrated our ranks, and he has done his job.” Earlier this month, Zainuddin reportedly criticized Mehsud following an attack on a mosque that killed 33 people. He told the Associated Press, “Whatever Baitullah Mehsud and his associates are doing in the name of Islam is not a jihad, and in fact it is rioting and terrorism…Islam stands for peace, not for terrorism.”
The purported rivalry between Mehsud and Zainuddin is interesting and goes much deeper than last month’s statement. Zainuddin, also a member of the Mehsud tribe, split from the Tehreek-e-Taliban nine months ago, according to the UK’s Daily Telegraph. The NY Times reported that he had formed an alliance with Turkestan Bhaitani, an older Taliban fighter who had switched sides to ally with the government, [although the Pakistani military 'officially' denies supporting either Zainuddin or Bhaitani].
According to the Daily Times, Zainuddin was also the self-appointed successor of his cousin Abdullah Mehsud, a top Taliban commander best known for masterminding the October 2004 kidnapping of two Chinese engineers in Pakistan. He was killed in 2007 when security forces raided his hideout in Balochistan. After his death, Baitullah Mehsud emerged as the leading Taliban commander in the region, [the power base is located in South Waziristan], but sources note a splinter group claiming to be the successors of Abdullah [as well as the "real" Taliban] also formed at this time.
In fact, noted both the Daily Times and the Long War Journal, Zainuddin used posters with images of Abdullah Mehsud as well as pamphlets vilifying Baitullah Mehsud in order to recruit followers. The Daily Times cited one pamphlet distributed in Tank and South Waziristan on March 16, which said, “Baitullah Mehsud is not involved in jihad because Islam does not allow suicide attacks, which his group is perpetrating…Our doors are open to all those who have suffered injustice at the hands of Baitullah. We also warn people against keeping contacts with Baitullah or facilitating him in prolonging his rule.”
This past month, reported the NY Times, both Zainuddin and Bhaitani organized a tribal jirga with as many as 100 elders of the Mehsud tribe in the town of Tank in an effort to rally further opposition to Baitullah Mehsud. And, although Zainuddin said he commanded around 3,000 fighters, there is also no confirmation of these claims, [in fact, the Long War Journal suggests he had inflated the number to portray a greater influence and capability than was actually the case].
Here’s what we do know: 1. Zainuddin’s assassination Tuesday signified an escalation in the rivalry and the long-standing tit-for-tat murder campaign between Baitullah Mehsud and fraction groups. Dawn reported a successor has already been appointed to replace Zainuddin. However, although Baz Mohammed indicated the murder would strengthen “their resolve to wage war against Baitullah,” other news sources indicate it may instead intimidate others from joining the anti-Mehsud group.
According to the Guardian, as he came to power, Baitullah had in fact “demonstrated his utter ruthlessness by killing hundreds of the Mehsud tribe’s traditional elders…who might have led resistance.” McClatchy News spoke to around a dozen Mehsud chiefs in separate meetings. One tribal chief told the news agency, “Not since the time of Alexander the Great have the Mehsud people suffered such slavery…We want to stand with Zainuddin but we don’t trust the government. Three times in the past, they have made deals with Baitullah Mehsud…We are scared that the generals will make up with him again.”
2. Although the Pakistani military officially denies this, most sources report the rise of these anti-Mehsud groups has been part of the state’s strategy to isolate Baitullah Mehsud and his supporters, particularly since “Many believe that Mehsud can be defeated only by a member of his own clan,” noted McClatchy.
This information is problematic, to say the least. Just because Zainuddin and Bhaitani said their fighters would remain neutral against any government offensive against Mehsud’s network does not mean their own motives are clean and rosy. In fact, in an interview with McClatchy News this month, Zainuddin noted he diverged with Baitullah on two fundamental points: the use of suicide bombing and attacks on Pakistan, since, as he noted, “Islam doesn’t give permission to fight against a Muslim country.” However, the late commander had also pledged to send his forces into Afghanistan once Mehsud is vanquished to expel international forces. He told McClatchy, “The whole Muslim world should come together because all infidels have come together against Islam. Whether it is Iraq, Afghanistan, Palestine, Chechnya, Muslims must protect ourselves…The problem is that we cannot go to Afghanistan these days because we have had to deal with Baitullah.”
So ultimately, in an effort to defeat a short-term but dangerous enemy, we are once again breeding further militancy, a phenomenon that will undoubtedly haunt us [and the West] in the long-run. While I understand the military may have to resort to such measures to create fissures in the militant network, the ramifications and the true benefits of such a strategy must be further weighed. In our effort to take back our country, we need to be aware of whose hands we are placing our future.
As Pakistan prepares to launch its offensive into South Waziristan and resolutely target Baitullah Mehsud, it is abundantly clear that this conflict is not black-and-white, a fact I tried to make clear in my above analysis. It is made increasingly more complex amid news of continuing U.S. drone strikes. Late Tuesday, media outlets reported that 45 people were killed in an alleged drone attack in South Waziristan. According to the NY Times, “If the reports are indeed accurate and if the attack was carried out by a drone, the strike could be the deadliest since the United States began using the aircraft” in Pakistan’s tribal areas, a fact sure to exacerbate anti-American sentiment in the region.

His successor is his brother. I guess they need a Mehsud with influence for the balance of power.
And yes, I agree with the last part. Is the Army by supporting the splinter group just digging itself into a deeper hole? Creating more Frankenstein’s monsters?
That’s one reason that they haven’t armed the lashkars or tribal miliitias. For fear that they might just end up becoming renegade.
The Army has to knock out the top leadership of the Taliban otherwise a resurgence would be imminent.
Thanks for that detail Yawar re: Zainuddin’s successor. There were actually SO many details I wanted to include in this already mammoth post but thought I’d save everyone the hassle from reading CHUP Post: the novel edition. In all honesty, I didn’t expect to find so much complexity in the Mehsud-Zainuddin rivalry but the nerd in me took great relish in researching it.
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Kalsoom, as usual, a well composed article/analysis. Great work.
@ Yawar, your correct, the ARMY would be digging itself deeper and deeper in this hole. Unfortunately, it is on the one side all those drones to attack its territores and on the other, taking up ground operations to do the dirty work themselves against their own people. This is not only going to alienate it more amongst its own people, who feel that the ARMY was supposedly created/raised to protect their lives and its actions are contrarian to its actual objectives. So I see some tough times ahead for the Pakistani ARMY. From all corners, the Talib’s, the Local Popolation, The Govt. and the US of A who will keep waving those Green Backs at it like a juicy bone to work Unc Sam’s agenda. However sad it may sound, it is a fact.
2nd Part of your post suggesting elimination of the Taliban Top Brass. I dont think it has any value any more. The FRANKENSTEIN has awakened. It is now an ideology, like the AL Q, infact maybe bigger than the Al Q because it has regional and religious ambitions. Unlike the AL Q which created an ideology of working for Islam andavenging for islam and left it at that, i feel Talib’s nurture aspirations of ruling the globe, beginning from AFPAK. This Aspiration makes it different from AL Q and more dangerous at that. You cannot deny that there are people who actually support the TALIB’s even urban centres. Affluent or otherwise. People do see them as saviours (At lease some section does however small or big it maybe). Let me cite an example here for you. The terrorism in Punjab (India) during the 80′s was not that widely received by sikh’s until after the infamous 1984 Operation Blue Star. It was the operation inside the Golden Temple (Vatican Equivalent of the Sikh’s) that got even the intelligentsia against the Govt. and get anti. So much so that the Lt. Gen who led the operation, got his own family members against him, to an extent that his Real Maternal Uncle in London not only disowned him, but also became and active Khalistani Supporter. The point here is, that by all these actions against these elements by the state, is only going to create more problem for them by alienating them further. There may seem some short term achievements like getting a few prized catches, but the ideology will not get crushed. The aspiration will never die out of the hearts and minds. For that, there is a need for a political solution, continuos and never ending propoganda to change the ideology and mindset. This will take time to provide result and hence is not a viable option immedieately. Thus the army and the govt. like the US have resorted to achieving short term goals, like they did in the 80′s Russian war. They’d end up doing the same, create a Frankenstein, and leave it loose and unattened once its objective is achieved.
TTV India,
Regarding your second point about eliminating the Taliban’s top brass: I think a distinction needs to be made between what Yawar is referring to and your point as well. The military is currently targeting groups associated with Baitullah Mehsud’s Tehreek-e-Taliban, i.e. the Taliban that has turned against the Pakistani state. They certainly have links to Al Qaeda, the Afghan Taliban, and other networks, but their primary strategy is to hijack the state. I agree with you though, a wider ideology does exist, and while tactical strategies work in the offensive, it must be supplemented by a more intangible “battle for the hearts and minds” to win this war in the long-term.
I also think that the Army CAN viably fight this threat without battling its own people if they properly use conduits like political agents in FATA to communicate their strategy and who they’re targeting to the people. The military is mainly Punjabi, and the use of political agents and the Frontier Corps can help them traverse the area and also make the offensive more legitimate. Just my two cents
Thanks for the comment!
Kalsoom. In these times, it is difficult to identify one from the other. Talib’s on the whole work on a sinlge point agenda. Which is obvious! About the ARMY, i suspect the army extremely based on their past history and their craving for green backs (this may sound harsh but this is how it seems to us outside). Case in point, just a few months ago, the same Baitullah Mehsud was termed as a patriot by none other than Gen Shuja Pasha, the ISI Head when Mehsud declared he’d fight alongside the Pak army in case of Indian Aggression. If you ask me, I’d bet my 2 cents on a political and social change through a long term confidence building process. I simply do not trust the ARMY and neither do those who are fighting against it.
Another case in point is a small incident post the 26/11. When 2 IAF sorties breached the AIR Space, the PAF jumped up to say they repudiated them to a retreat. Fair Enough, their objective is to do that. But the same PAF is sitting like a mute and dumb spectator when Unc Sam DRONES its sovereign lands. A typical case of convenience again. This attitude is what is going to create trouble (or has created trouble) for them. These double standards are the bane of the ARMY. It has the capabilities of stopping these attacks, but does not have the courage to go against imposed partner in GWOT. Until unless these things are not corrected, the general population will not support the state. They are the ones losing their lives. And if the very army which is supposed to protect them, supports their bloodshed and also indulges in it, how can you expect this thing to end. As i said, it will seem like a victory, but would be shortlived. The movement will spring up again, and again until the ideology is not crushed. Another aspect is that does the ARMY want to crush this ideology in the first place? After all, this very ideology was created by the ARMY over decades starting with Gen Zia. Erasing it from the minds of the population, would mean, the ARMY loses its trump card. That of being an Islamic ARMY, Jihad Fisbillah. So a serious doubt from all quarters on the intention of the army is going to prevail till it comes clean. The Heart and Mind are the key words here. However long it takes, that is the only solution available. More participation by people deprived of it. More opportunities in affected areas. More jobs and projects to create opportunities. Give them money and stability, and things can change in a year or even less. basic Human needs supercede everything else. States do not matter when it comes to ones livelihood and life itself. A social change is required rather than a forced change.
Great analysis Kalsoom. I attempted a rant on this but kept it brief at Roznamcha Bach.
Qari Zainuddin comes over as a “yes but no” militant – specifically against anything to do with the Pakistani state. If he truly had Pakistani state support how does that make the military establishment look to the outside world when this man said the real enemy was NATO in Afghanistan – supposedly an ally?
It doesn’t seem we’ve moved on from good and bad Taliban. They’ve learned nothing from the Swat.
Thanks Saesneg,
And all should read his post, Drone On, which connects Obama’s interview with Dawn, in which he goes on about cooking daal and reading Urdu poetry to the fact that 45 people were killed in the deadliest drone strike! It certainly comes off as patronizing, to say the least, to claim to understand a nation and yet continue a policy that exhibits otherwise. Am SO upset with Obama, and as people on this blog know, I am/was a big fan.
http://saesneg.wordpress.com/2009/06/24/drone-on/
Here’s also the direct link to Obama’s interview with Dawn:
http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/world/12-beat-extremists-you-can-says-obama–bi-04
Remember he was the most hawkish on Pakistan. I remember reading this in 2007 and shaking a little:
http://www.reuters.com/article/domesticNews/idUSN0132206420070801
I mean, hawkish of the presidential candidates
He was hawkish, but honestly I also think he was the most upfront and honest than the other candidates. Do you think McCain, if he was president, wouldn’t use the same policy? What I did hope was that all his talk of “change” would apply to Pakistan as well, but I guess it’s only selective change
I am actually really curious to know how effective drones really are – what is the technology behind the targets? Are CIA agents literally sitting somewhere in the US and controlling it like it’s some sort of video game or are they strategically targeting these spots because the drone has some kind of camera that proves the militant is located there?
[...] at CHUP! – Changing Up Pakistan analyzes the assassination of Taliban commander Qari Zainuddin, a rival of the leading Taliban leader [...]
Latest development (surprise surprise) Baitullah deputy claims responsibility for Zainuddin’s assassination: http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/03-baitullah-deputy-claims-killing-of-zainuddin-ss-03
He told the AFP, “We killed Qari Zainuddin because he was a miscreant, he was killed on the orders of Baitullah…Anyone who works against us will face the same fate.”
Assasination of Zainuddin shows the Baitullah wicket is getting weak and panic is setting in. However, for the army to setup another rival faction is indeed dangerous since history shows that after their purpose is servd and they are set loose, they tend to become problems themselves.
Education, religious and secular, is extremely important to be propogated in order for the Taliban virus” to be eliminated. If the people are educated on what is Islam they would not follow these fanatics blindly in search of a Paradise that their very actions keeps away from them.
I think Zainuddin’s assassination could actually be a sign of two things: Either 1) Baitullah’s camp is getting panicked by these fraction groups being armed and supported by the military to isolate them or 2) It was a simple part of the power rivalry/tit-for-tat campaign between Mehsud and these groups. Both are possible too.
I did read somewhere (I think the Long War Journal, which I try to take with a grain of salt) that elders within the Mehsud tribe, while fearful of turning on Baitullah, were also dismissive of Zainuddin and Bhaitani because of their so-called alliance with the government. Again, I take such analysis with a grain of salt (mainly because I couldn’t find another source to back it up), but I do think it raises an important point that we don’t KNOW how influential Zainuddin was or how much of a threat he really was to Baitullah Mehsud.
[...] dalam CHUP! – Changing Up Pakistan menganalisa pembunuhan komandan Taliban Qari Zainuddin, rival pemimpin Taliban Baitullah [...]
Armed clashes between the two Taliban rival factions. I seriously wonder what the Pakistani Army has its sleeves by supporting one against the other.
At Qari Zainuddin’s funeral, it was closely guarded by his faction and…get this, the police. Which clearly shows that the establishment is siding with the anti-Baitullah group.
And a top Taliban commander, trainer of the suicide bombers was killed yesterday. So much happening…
O why can’t we just have a cup of tea and play some cricket?
The deathof Qari Zainuddin was not very good for Pak Army bcoz the only strong group against Baitullah was Zainuddins. I think yawar is wrong about getting into some dirt hole. Zainuddin became commander after Abdullah Mehsud who was the real Taliban he was released from Gitmo. Zainuddin was the real man to tackle Baitullah he was just 20. The Government now should support Zainuddins group and ally it with Turkistans and Maulvi Nazir of the wazir and then tackle Baitullah after eliminating Baitullah they should be disarmed by stating that peace has returned to FATA.
While watching a video of Baitullah group i was amused to find that his men were riding a ford pickup, everyone knows that in Pakistan there are no fords now who is aiding them?Everyone knows it.
Kalsoom, the new pic on the main page is amazing. Where is it from?
Thanks! I think it’s more encompassing of this blog’s mission than my last banner. I bought it off of iStock photo!
I like the new photo. The assassination of Zainuddin is probably encouraging to the Pak army as it shows cracks within the Taliban. However, the army will definitely have more Frankensteins to deal with in the future as a result of these cracks.
I really dont understand why r u all so happy on Zainuddins death in a war u have to make the maximum friends and minimum enemies u cant win a war by opening so many fronts at a sigle time and the local ppl should support u.
[...] The killing on Tuesday of Mehsud rival Qari Zainuddin has also encouraged speculation that the military is working hard on time-honoured tactics of divide and rule, by trying to find tribal leaders who will turn against Mehsud (the blog Changing up Pakistan has produced an excellent round-up of media reports on Zainuddin’s death). [...]