AP Photo from Boston Globe's Big Picture (Oct 2009)
Last summer, the plight of Pakistan’s Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) garnered constant news attention. However, once the government announced the phased return home of these people last July (beginning with IDPs from Malakand province), the coverage all but came to a halt. The IDP situation was just not news worthy anymore. But the sad reality is that it never stopped being an issue. Just last month, news agencies reported that an estimated one million Pakistanis remain displaced, adding, “Most of the refugees are staying with host families, but tens of thousands are in relief camps.” According to the organization’s news release, “UNHCR has also rushed relief supplies to help an estimated 135,000 people who fled their homes to escape a security forces operation against militants in Orakzai Agency in December 2009.” A humanitarian update released February 5 by the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) further reported that since December 2009, the number of IDPs from Orakzai has risen nearly tenfold to over 23,000, [ReliefWeb also has an interesting read on Shia IDPs from Orakzai and their situation].
There are also around 250,000 IDPs from Bajaur, who have been displaced since 2008. In Jalozai, the site of one of UNHCR’s largest IDP camps, around 74 percent are from this tribal agency. So, although a large number of IDPs have returned home in the past year (almost 1.7 million people, mostly to Swat and other districts of Malakand Division), a significant amount remain displaced.
As for those who have gone back, their return was the easiest part of the journey. Yesterday, Al Jazeera English had a very interesting story [see below] on the current situation of Swat Valley, nearly a year after the military regained control of the area. In the report, correspondent Hashem Ahelbarra noted that IDP returnees in Swat feel that progress and rebuilding has been too slow “and not enough.” In order to tap into the government funds for these people, Swati families have to open a bank account and get an ATM card, from which they can withdraw $12 at the end of every month. With that meager amount, they can only buy a bag of flour and four kilograms of “low-quality rice,” hardly enough to feed their entire family.
As someone who works in the philanthropy field and, more specifically, with development issues in Pakistan, I find the issue of handouts, even if it’s via more innovative ATM cards, to be problematic. In terms of short-term emergency response, it does provide immediate relief to families in a more organized way than straight cash distribution. However, from a long-term lens, handouts foster a deeper dependency between donor and recipient. It is not a sustainable solution and, at the end of the day, doesn’t address the root causes of the problem, especially if food prices continue to rise and the security situation remains tense, (13 were killed and 40 were injured in a suicide attack in Mingora last month).
Therefore, there needs to be further efforts to build local capacity in Swat in order to develop these communities and lessen their dependence on government and international agencies for basic necessities. This week, the UN World Food Programme announced it has contracted eight mills in Swat Valley to produce fortified wheat flour, “in a bid to boost the local economy and make food more easily accessible to families in the area.” Not only will this initiative ideally provide jobs and generate income in the area, the locally produced flour is also expected to stabilize prices. According to the UN, “They will have the capacity to produce more than 2,000 metric tons of wheat flour daily. That capacity will be increased as the security situation improves.”
All of this is a lot easier said than done, especially given that peace is still a tenuous notion in Swat Valley. However, it is nevertheless important to view reconstruction from a more long-term perspective in order to achieve more sustainable and lasting solutions.
CHUP! - Changing Up Pakistan 
[…] the coverage all but came to a halt. The IDP situation was just […] Read more at: CHUP! – Changing Up Pakistan al jazeera, al jazeera english, ap photo, bajaur, big picture, boston globe, host families, […]
Kalsoom: Thanks for the information. I have posted this video a few days ago on my blog. I have asked the question “Why have we not seen video of the destruction and the refugee camps? They have been hidden from the world press as it would lead to the End of the War(s), as
U.S. anti-war movement would blast this hiding of the inhumane treatment of villagers “displaced” by U.S. backed military action. If you have any influence, get the refugee camp video on the web.
I will add your blog to my blogsite:
http://outofcentralasianow.wordpress.com/
Thanks,
In Peace,
John
Thanks John,
Though I should add that I support the military’s operations in the frontier and tribal areas, and I think that it’s simplistic to say they were treated inhumanely simply because of “US backed military action.” You neglected to point out the how bad the situation was before the military went in, when the Taliban (particularly the Swati Taliban) had reign in these towns and areas. This does not justify the millions of people who were without homes, but it should make us all remember that this war should be anything but polarized.
The IDP crisis in Pakistan is and was dire. While the government and international agencies’ response could have been better (especially with the many IDPs living with host families), there was at least an effort to absorb many of these people into the camps and an attempt to return many of them home after several months (though many still live in the camps including those from Bajaur displaced from the last offensive, as I pointed out in my post).
I could go into an exhaustive list of the mistakes made about why these people were forced into displacement into the first place, but I don’t see that as productive.
What I will say is that while I supported the military’s counterinsurgency operation (though I am cautious to tout any successes as they have done), I do think the state needed to and needs to do more to support the victims of this war. This is two pronged – for those still living in the camps, and for those who have returned home. The state’s responsibility doesn’t end with a successful phased return.
Thanks again for your comment!
One more thing to add that I didn’t note in my post but I think is important:
In order to come up with strategic solutions in rehabilitating these communities, we need to also understand that each conflict-affected area has a different set of nuances that need to be taken into consideration when designing programs. While some agencies like Oxfam and the rural support network have been really great in this regard, sometimes NGOs and other agencies lack the ability to think like this.
For instance, if I was to implement a pilot development project in Buner, the ground realities are considerably different than Swat. For instance, in Buner the security situation is more stable and the population tends to be relatively higher-income than Swat. As a result, a program I might design for Buner would have to be adapted for the needs in Swat. We’d have to engage the communities in different ways.
Case in point, despite the issue of food in Swat, from my own knowledge of Buner, they have been receiving so many “handouts” (i.e. food) from int’l agencies that they are actually selling it back into the market at an inflated price – problematic, to say the least.
Ok, rambling done 🙂
a pictures worth a thousand words….awesome photograph
Hello Kulsoom: this is a very well crafted article and you’ve articulated your arguments really well (in my opinion).
As to your last post/comment about relief aid and Swat/Buner, I would say that if all you have is a hammer in your toolbox then everything appears like a nail – especially when it happens to be a sledgehammer that takes the form of a drone strike. Alas, no need for nuances there…
International aid could be and should be far more effective and sustainable in empowering communities by engaging them and equipping them with the tools to shape their own destiny (as opposed to having one descend upon you in the form of an addictive ‘handout’). Thats why development aid agencies (bilateral and multilateral) should seriously look at socioeconomic empowerment at the base-of-the-pyramid through smart, catalytic investments in venture philanthropy/social entrepreneurship – what Jacqueline Novogratz refers to as ‘patient capital” …philanthropists who practice archaic, piecemeal, myopic, small project-oriented, ‘classical NGO’ philanthropy should take note…they’re simply reinforcing the mediocrity and complacency that accompanies these ‘handouts’.
Keep up the good work!
Thanks Asher! I completely agree – and for those who didn’t see Jacqueline Novogratz on Christiane Amanpour’s show (along with Mosharraf Zaidi!) here’s the link (you can download the podcast): http://amanpour.blogs.cnn.com/2009/11/08/amanpour-podcast/
Really a great interview to learn more about this more entrepreneurial approach to philanthropy and social investment. Also some great insight by the head of the Kashf Foundation, which does microcredit in Pakistan.
One of the hardest challenges Pakistan faced in this war against terrorism was to manage the ever increasing number of IDP’s. With assistance from local and international community, the challenge was met to some extent but due to limited resources, there were complications also. The bigger challenge now is to re-settle the displaced people. Give them back what they have lost.
The rehabilitation of IDP’s should be the primary objective on the agenda and this need to be done with a future insight as the local populations are apprehensive of moving back due to history of pervious operations where the Taliban returned after the military offensive. While the troops cannot be stationed in Waziristan for an indefinite period, the authorities need to ensure that the local authorities are well-equipped and trained so that the Taliban cannot make a comeback.
The locals often have to skate on very thin ice as if the decline refuge to Taliban they face harsh consequences of their stance and if they cave in to the pressure then the security forces consider them as enemy combatants.