The HuT-Military Connection

On Tuesday, news agencies reported that authorities detained a Pakistani Army officer, Brigadier General Ali Khan, on suspicion of links to banned militant outfit Hizb ut-Tahrir (HuT). According to the New York Times,

General Khan was serving at the General Headquarters of the Pakistan Army in the garrison city of Rawalpindi, outside the capital, Islamabad. He was picked up for questioning by the Special Investigative Branch of the Pakistan Army on May 6, but the announcement of the arrest was made Tuesday after an army spokesman confirmed that he had been detained to the BBC Urdu Web site.

Army spokesman Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas told reporters, “We have a zero tolerance policy towards people indulging in such activities.”

Zero tolerance? Selective tolerance? Tomato To-mah-to? Hmm.

The Express Tribune yesterday noted it was unclear whether the arrest was part of a larger “cleansing process” of the military. However, on Wednesday, the military announced that it had begun investigating other officers with links to HuT, saying they had questioned four majors with links to the case.

But just who is HuT, aside from a pretty convenient, ridiculously good-looking acronym?

HuT, or Hizb ut-Tahrir, meaning Party of Liberation, is a radical Islamist group that was established in 1953 and “wants to revive the Islamic caliphate and unify Muslim countries under Islamic laws.”  According to GlobalSecurity.org,

Hizb ut-Tahrir now has its main base in Western Europe, but it has large followings in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Kazakhstan, as well as in China’s traditionally Muslim Xinjiang Province. Most of its members are believed to be ethnic Uzbeks. Its expansion into Central Asia coincided with the breakup of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s. By one estimate there are more than 10,000 followers in Central Asia. Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami has been active in Central Asia since the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The group was banned in Pakistan under Pervez Musharraf‘s regime, but continues to operate relatively freely in the country, reports Reuters, “clandestinely distributing leaflets and sending e-mail and text messages.” On HuT’s UK website, the group notes that Pakistan “is a powerful nuclear-armed country, let down by a corrupt government, absence of Islamic rule and subservience to the West.”

Analyst Imtiaz Gul told the news agency that the outfit, which claims to have a peaceful agenda, has some influence within the military. “They basically address educated people, educated Muslims, middle-class, lower middle-class.” In Britain, where they are not banned, the group allegedly attracts well-educated British Pakistanis as supporters, and told Reuters that HuT has not specifically targeted Pakistan’s military, but “works with all sections of society.”

But according to the New York Times, HuT – apart from organizing underground meetings and seminars in Pakistan – also uses SMS text messages and social networking sites to spread its message. The Times noted, “A recent text message sent out by the media office of Hizb-ut-Tahrir on June 9 stated: ‘Remove the traitors amongst the civilian and military leadership. Fulfill your obligation by establishing Khilafah,’ meaning the caliphate.”

The Guardian‘s Declan Walsh echoed in his coverage, “HuT has long faced accusations of seeking to infiltrate Pakistan’s army. In the wake of Bin Laden’s death it distributed pamphlets near army bases calling on officers to overthrow the government and forge a new Islamic caliphate.” Former HuT activist Maajid Nawaz, now part of Quilliam, a UK think tank, told the Guardian that HuT plans to come to power through a military coup. Walsh noted, “[Nawaz] has previously admitted recruiting Pakistani officers who were attending a training course in Sandhurst in 2000.” Nawaz told the Guardian in 2009, “We sent them back to Pakistan to infiltrate the army. They were recruiting for three years and tried to mount a coup.” The plotters were discovered and jailed by then president Pervez Musharraf, he said.

 The Pakistani military has recently come under fire for its alleged ties with militants – particularly following the Osama bin Laden raid and the PNS Mehran attack last month. Omar Waraich wrote in TIME this week that it has been “a grim seven weeks for Pakistan’s powerful generals.” Talat Masood, a retired lieutenant general-turned-analyst told Waraich, “It’s amazing the level of criticism that the military leadership is facing. It’s clearly the worst in its history.” Perceptions of COAS Gen. Kayani are increasingly negative, if polls are anything to go by. While the most recent Pew (pee-you) poll on Pakistan found that the army remains popular (79% says it has a good influence on the country), only 52% of respondents gave Kayani a favorable rating, down from 57% before the Osama bin Laden raid.

However, analysts are skeptical that Kayani will be fired or pushed out of his position. The Atlantic Council’s Shuja Nawaz told TIME, “My understanding is that there is a debate on different issues within the corps commanders and senior officers from the General Headquarter. It is not in the form of pressure on General Kayani as such, but on what to do in response to the criticism.”

The arrest of Khan and the investigation into other officers linked to this case are indicative of such a response. Imtiaz Gul wrote in the AfPak Channel this week,

The bad news of Khan’s arrest is that it underlines the presence of a radical mindset within the armed forces. The good news is that it probably also reflects new thinking: greater attention to all those who might be influenced by organisations such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and Lashkar e-Taiba. Moreover, if the army can demonstrate it has gone after suspected militant officers successfully, it might be able to release some of the pressure it currently faces from the United States, which is demanding that Pakistan do more to fight Pakistan.

But is this indicative of a greater purge within military ranks? A part of me – the part that still blinks at Pakistan with hopeful puppy dog eyes – wishes this were true. But the larger part of me – the part that rolls eyes frequently and scoffs snarkily – has heard this tired refrain before. Yes, the arrest of Khan is significant. The investigations are notable. But I’d wait before passing judgment on whether there is an impending sea change. HuT is a dangerous outfit, despite their claims to the contrary. That is certain. But is the military rooting out infiltration amidst its ranks because it’s genuinely concerned with extremist tendencies, or because the HuT-specific links are a direct threat to the military’s authority? Would the Army perform similar exercises with officers linked to other militant groups that still hold strategic interest?

The jury’s still out.

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Mumbai Attacks: One Year Later

AFP/Getty: The Taj Hotel on fire on Nov 26 2008

As the anniversary of the Mumbai attacks fast approaches, we have been inundated with op-eds, analysis, and statements – mostly centered on the impact of 26/11 on Indo-Pak relations and the status of Lashkar-e-Taiba today. The attacks on November 26, 2008, when 10 gunmen armed with assault rifles and explosives besieged the city of Mumbai for 60 hours, killing 170 people and wounding 300 others, may not have been India’s deadliest incident, but it did change “the world’s understanding of terrorism in India as real-time television footage streamed into American and European living rooms,” noted Georgetown University’s Christine Fair. In an op-ed in Monday’s Wall Street Journal, she added, “It catalyzed discussions in Washington and Delhi about Lashkar-e-Taiba and the danger that group and its fellow travelers pose not just to India but to other countries.”

During his state visit to Washington, Indian PM Manmohan Singh maintained past rhetoric when he asserted that Islamabad had not done enough against the perpetrators of the 26/11 attacks. He told reporters, “We have been the victims of Pakistan-aided, -abetted and-inspired terrorism for nearly 25 years. We would like the United States to use all its influence with Pakistan to desist from that path. Pakistan has nothing to fear from India. It’s a tragedy that Pakistan has come to the point of using terror as an instrument of state policy.”

The recent arrests of two men in Chicago with alleged ties to Lashkar only further confirm suspicions of the militant group’s growing reach and influence, and how it has increasingly become a transnational threat. According to Reuters, “David Headley and Tahawwur Hussain Rana were arrested last month and accused of plotting an attack on Danish newspaper Jyllands-Posten, which ran cartoons of the Prophet Mohammad in 2005.” According to court documents, the two men allegedly “discussed their plans with members of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Al-Qaeda linked Pakistan-based militant Ilyas Kashmiri,” labeled the fourth most wanted terrorist by Pakistan’s Interior Ministry. Reuters added, “Lashkar also talked to them  [Headley and Rana] about possible attacks in India and suggested these should be given priority over the alleged plot in Denmark.”

Last Thursday, HBO premiered a very timely and significant film entitled, Terror in Mumbai. Narrated by Newsweek and CNN’s Fareed Zakaria, The documentary chronicles the time period the ten LeT gunmen attacked Mumbai, using interviews with police, survivors, tapped phone calls between the men and their commanders in Pakistan, and footage of the captured gunmen, Mohammed Ajmal Kasab‘s confession. The film offers incredible insight into the group, the psychology of these young gunmen, and their relationship with senior figures within the organization. Here are a few of my own observations:

The Mumbai gunmen were young boys from rural Pakistan with very little exposure to the outside world. Perhaps the most chilling clips of Terror in Mumbai featured the the tapped conversations between the gunmen and their “controller,”a man by the name of Brother Wasi, allegedly based in Pakistan. According to the film, Indian undercover agents had reportedly fed 35 SIM cards to the LeT. After the beginning of the attacks on Mumbai’s Leopold’s Cafe and CST Railway Station, police began combing cell phone frequencies, and learned that three of the aforementioned SIM cards had been activated. During a very telling clip, the controller was speaking to the gunmen, urging them to set fire to the Taj Hotel. Overwhelmed by the opulence of their surroundings, the gunman said over the phone, “There are computers here with high-tech screens! It’s amazing. The windows are huge! It’s got two kitchens, a bath, and a little shop.” The controller reminded him, “Start the fire, my brother. Start a proper fire. That’s the important thing.”

The psychology of these young gunmen is fascinating, particularly since they had reportedly been indoctrinated over the course of three months, when they undertook their “training.” During this time, they went from being impressionable young boys to hardened militants. Although this is a relatively short amount of time, Reuel Marc Gerecht from the Foundation for the Defense of Democracies told Zakaria on his CNN GPS show, “Once you’ve sort of got the imbibed the idea of jihadism, once you’ve imbibed the idea that you can…more or less exile people from a moral universe that you live in, it’s not that difficult… to get young men to kill.” In the film, one witness at the CST Railway Station noted the gunmen “showed no fear or horror. They were like children firing toy guns…killing whoever they chose.”

In a clip where Kasab was being interrogated, he revealed that recruits during their training were “forbidden to speak to one another,” thereby furthering their isolation and strengthening the hold of commanders over these young men. At the end of their training, their commanders told them, “Guys, the time has come for your test…now we’ll know who’s for real.” When asked if he felt pity for the people they gunned down, Kasab hesitated before answering, “I did but he [the controller] said you have to do these things, if you’re going to be a big man and go to Heaven.”

Terrorism has increasingly become transnational and remote. One of the most striking parts of Terror in Mumbai was the ability of a single controller to keep not only a firm grasp on the situation, but also on the gunmen. Brother Wasi was in constant contact with the young men, who continuously updated him on their whereabouts and the overall situation. Moreover, Wasi was closely monitoring news channels’ coverage of the Mumbai attacks, allowing him further insight into the on the ground reality, or at least how media outlets were portraying them. This access allowed Brother Wasi to subsequently direct the gunmen to methods of garnering further media attention. Speaking to a gunman in the Taj Hotel, Brother Wasi said, “My brother, yours is the most important target…the media is covering it more than any other.” On his CNN show GPS, Zakaria further commented, “Brother Wasi, the remote controller of the terrorists, understands that in this day in age unless it is seen on TV around the world it has not happened.”

Now almost one year later, Terror in Mumbai is a chilling reminder of the attacks as well as the organization of the Lashkar e Taiba. Since the attacks, the Indian government has presented Pakistan with seven dossiers of evidence. However, they have all been met with Interior Minister Rehman Malik‘s demands for more information. As a result, relations between New Delhi and Islamabad remain strained. Given the current status quo and the widening trust deficit, what will it take to change the stagnant relations between India and Pakistan? In terms of the post-Mumbai investigations, which side will have to give to ensure progress?

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