Day 3 of the Army’s much-anticipated ground offensive in South Waziristan was underway Monday, and Maj. Gen. Athar Abbas met with reporters to update them on the operation’s progress. According to news agencies, the Pakistan Army is “ahead of schedule” by 36 hours, advancing up to 15 kilometers (9 miles) into the mountainous area. In the last 24 hours, Abbas added, forces have “enveloped” Kotkai, the town of Taliban commander Qari Hussain, while guerrillas have “taken positions on mountains.” According to the military spokesman, 78 militants and nine soldiers have been killed since the offensive launched Saturday. The spokesman from the Taliban’s camp, not surprisingly, offered contradictory numbers, countering that militants have inflicted “heavy casualties” on government troops. Given that there is no way to verify either statements [reporters are barred from South Waziristan], I wanted to provide a breakdown of what we do know, [or at least what we know better]:
1. The Rah-e-Nijat offensive [“Path to Salvation”] has been a long time coming. In June 2009, the military announced this new offensive into South Waziristan, but only unleashed artillery and air strikes on the area, weakening the militant stronghold but certainly not defeating it. There were several reasons for this, but I shall highlight one of the main ones. In June, a spokesman from Gul Bahadur‘s militant group in North Waziristan [a rival of Mehsud’s Taliban] announced they were scrapping their peace deal “because of U.S. drone strikes in the region.” The Taliban faction had initially agreed to sit on the sidelines during the military’s South Waziristan offensive, but the disintegration of the deal complicated the Army’s chance at success in the region. As the BBC’s Syed Shoaib Hasan noted back in July, “no one has ever defeated a combined insurgency in the Waziristan area.”
However, according to news agencies, the army has once again “come to an understanding” with Bahadur’s group as well as the Taliban faction of Maulvi Nasir to keep them from fighting against the government during the offensive. According to the Associated Press, not only do the groups agree to not join the Mehsud Taliban’s forces, “They will also allow the army to move through their own lands unimpeded, giving the military additional fronts from which to attack the Taliban.” The news agency added, “The agreements underscore Pakistan’s past practice of targeting only militant groups that attack the government or its forces inside Pakistan.” The issue of U.S. and NATO troops across the border is therefore a different matter entirely, and will probably mean the current offensive will have little to no impact on the U.S. war in Afghanistan. Moreover, while the Army is terming this as no more than an “understanding,” it will be interesting to see how this loose alliance will pan out in the long-term. Because the Army must break up the enemy, the deal is tactically necessary in the short-term, but may be strategically problematic later on.
2. Who is the Army fighting in the offensive? We have just established who the military is not fighting in this operation. In Rah-e-Nijat, being termed “the mother of all battles,” the Army is seeking to destroy the Taliban faction of the late Baitullah Mehsud, who was killed in a drone strike in August and succeeded by Hakimullah Mehsud. The militants are said to number between 5,000 – 15,000.
This number includes “some hundred” to 2,000 pissed off Uzbek fighters. According to Dawn, “The reported death of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) leader Tahir Yuldashev in a drone attack in South Waziristan in August was a big blow to the violent foreign militant group that was waging a fierce campaign against Pakistan and its state agencies.” The Uzbek militants and other foreign fighters will reportedly “provide some stiff resistance,” mainly because they “have few places they can escape to,” noted a Dawn editorial.
The new Mehsud [who I dubbed Mehsud 2.0 in this post] recently vowed to launch a wave of attacks in Pakistan’s main cities, a threat we saw come to life last week. The breadth and reach of the recent violence, though, means the Mehsud Taliban has alliances with militant groups in other parts of the country, particularly in Punjab, [i.e., the Lashkar-e-Jhanghvi and the Jaish-e-Muhammad]. Therefore, although the military is targeting the Mehsud stronghold in South Waziristan, it is unlikely attacks in major cities will stop, unless the government plans to target these organizations as well. [This point was illustrated Tuesday, when suicide bombers struck Islamabad’s International Islamic University.]
3. The Army’s sent 28,000 additional troops to South Waziristan. That’s good right? On paper, sure. Pakistan’s forces against roughly 10,000 militants is a ratio of 3:1. However, this isn’t your run-of-the-mill conventional warfare. This is counterinsurgency. According to a defense analyst who spoke to NPR Monday, the number of troops are far “too low,” and such numbers “will force them into guerrilla warfare that could last for years.” Over at the Long War Journal, Bill Roggio cited a study done by Sameer Lalwani at the New America Foundation, who noted, “Between 370,000 and 430,000 more troops would be needed in the FATA and the NWFP region to meet the minimum force-to-population ratios prescribed by counterinsurgency (COIN) doctrine, much higher than current Pakistani deployments of 150,000 [overall in the region].” This is in part due to the “demographic and topographic terrain” of the region which are ideal for protracted insurgency and therefore call for much “higher than average force ratios and far more military assets than Pakistan possesses.”
With winter fast-approaching, time is not on the Army’s side, though Newsline‘s Nadir Hassan conceded, “the harsh conditions may be to the army’s benefit. For over two decades, until a ceasefire was negotiated in 2003, Pakistan’s troops had been fighting the Indians to a standstill in Siachen. The topography and weather of Siachen is like South Waziristan on steroids and the experience should give an advantage to the army.” At the same time, though, the military has been and will continue to face stiff resistance from militants in the region, ultimately meaning the operation will last longer than the predicted few weeks.
What is still unclear is the fate of the over 170,000 people displaced by the South Waziristan operation, [also highlighted at the Zeitgeist Politics]. Families began leaving the region in June, following the military’s announcement of Rah-e-Nijat, and settling mainly in Dera Ismail Khan and Tank. According to McClatchy News, “The refugees are being offered no food, blankets or other aid, however, no camps have been set up for them and resentment against the government and army is growing fast. The government halted aid in September, apparently in an attempt to prevent it from making its way into the hands of the Taliban.” In an interview with BBC News Monday, correspondent Syed Shoaib Hasan echoed that adequate supplies have not been provided so far to the rising number of IDPs, and spoke further on the issue of militants potentially hiding amongst the displaced. Despite the registration points that have been set up, he noted, “it is very difficult to tell who is Taliban and who is not.”
Given that Waziristan has never been truly “conquered,” and recent offensives have only been “partially successful,” [ending in peace deals rather than military control], it seems we have a tough, wintry road ahead of us.
As mentioned, the attacks on the main cities have hardly stopped. A few hours ago, a suicide bomber struck at Islamabad’s Islamic University, killing six people: http://www.dawn.com/wps/wcm/connect/dawn-content-library/dawn/news/pakistan/04-blast1-in-islamabad-qs-07
great article!
btw I thought the study by Sameer Lalwani was really interesting too – the part about making up the minimum troop numbers is pretty disheartening, especially with the huge number of troops stationed on the eastern border which is unlikely to change. He also raised the issue that a lot of the army command would be resistant to retraining any large section of the army for COIN for the same reason as opponents of COIN in the US army are – that it would make them unfit for conventional war (he gave the example of the IDF and its poor performance against Hezbollah in 2006).
Your focus on COIN is right – but I think numbers are less important than doctrine, strategy and tactics.
The surge in Iraq is mistakenly seen as being mostly about sending in more troops. In reality, it was mostly about deploying troops in radically different ways.
Is the mission of the Pakistan army to kill militants? Or to provide security for civilians? The latter is at the heart of any COIN strategy.
(Many thx for the hugely useful and insightful coverage by the way.)
David,
You’re right, I was being selective. I do think troop numbers are important because of the difference of Pakistan being in a protracted conflict – we can’t essentially afford to be fighting this war for months on end, and as the likelihood for longer operation increases, so does the chances that the Army will end the operation with a “peace deal” rather than defeating the Mehsud Taliban.
That being said, it’s not just about deploying troops, but as you said, deploying them in the “COIN” way – and I think the aftermath of the offensive is where the issue will really come in – namely, how does the military aim to “hold” this area? South Waziristan has never had a history of direct government control, so that issue will be interesting to say the least. Moreover, if Pakistan is also fighting a war of perceptions then they really should be paying more heed to the numbers of ppl displaced by the offensive.
Rabia, here is a breakdown of total number of troop deployment, in the whole of Afghanistan.
ISAF = 64,500 (June, 2009), US (OEF) = 28,300 – Total: 92,800
I’d love to see Mr. Lalwani first lecture the very government he’s working for, in COIN ops, before writing about Pakistan army’s strategy of war.
That said, Pakistan Army’s 11 and 12 corps are already stationed in Waziristan area, and will take part in the ops. 30,000 soldiers are in addition to that already deployed troops.
The total number of troops in the region is close to 80,000.
Saad,
Lalwani doesn’t work for the American government – he works for a think tank. And I’m sure numbers of people, including the American military commanders, have already done their fair share of criticizing the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan.
Lalwani’s focus of his article is on Pakistan, and rightfully so. Pakistan has never truly fought a counterinsurgency war, and, as Rabia pointed out, many are resistant to being trained as such because their “great” enemy has always been on the eastern front. Troop numbers was a small part of this report, btw.
Alright, let me rephrase my sentence. He works for a think-tank that churns out policies and future strategies for the US?
That said, I only pointed out the issue pertaining to the number of troops deployed in the region, since another commentator choose to do so. I was only stating a different point of view.
But do tell me this, are you of the opinion that under prevailing circumstances, the threat from our eastern borders has lessened?
Because, I don’t see how can the army agree to simply remove their soldiers from the eastern border and put them in counter-insurgency training. It’ll financially cripple them, if not strategically decapitate them.
And in spite of all that criticism, we’re still not witnessing a troop surge in Afghanistan. Because just as Steven has pointed out, an increase in the number of troops doesn’t mean anything. What matters is that how you utilize your troops.
Being realistic, I don’t believe we can feasibly expect the military to ever believe the threat on the eastern borders has lessened. Therein lies the conundrum. While I don’t have any solutions, I wonder if more Frontier Corps could be recruited for this purpose – they are more accustomed to the terrain, speak the language, and are familiar with the cultural nuances.
And I think we will see some sort of troop surge in Afghanistan, probably not 40,000 as McChrystal has requested, but a moderate troop surge (properly allocated) is probably necessary.
Oh also a good article today, by Shuja Nawaz: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2009/10/20/how_to_help_pakistan_win_this_fight?page=0,0&%24Version=0&%24Path=/&%24Domain=.foreignpolicy.com,%20%24Version%3D0
Saad, I agree w/ your point about troop numbers in Afghanistan which is why it seems that the US is seriously considering redefining its goals in Afghanistan. The problem is that Pakistan won’t be able to redefine its goals in FATA in the same way, so it does seem like Pakistan needs those higher troop numbers more than the US does since Pakistan is facing an existential threat while the US is not.
Rabia, US has still to decide whether or not it wants to increase its number of troops in Afghanistan. They’ve not done it yet. So I’ll leave it at that.
That said, I think that the number of troops is not the deciding factor in our war against TTP. That’d be akin to looking at the conflict through a very narrow spectrum of the broad range of influences impacting the outcome.
Just to mention a few:
1. Internal dynamics, affected by, and the outcome of, all the elements of national power inclusive of political, psychological, economic elements, national morale, role of media etc.
2. The stated and ‘real’ aims of ISAF and ANA.
3. American short and long term objectives in the region.
4. Regional influences —- India (not necessarily acting independently) and Iran in particular.
5. Quality of military strategy and execution.
[…] at CHUP! – Changing Up Pakistan updates on the status of the day 3 of the Pakistan army's South Waziristan offensive against the Talibans. […]
A good quote from David Ignatius’ piece on Waziristan in the Washington Post:
“The Pakistani strategy for rebuilding control here might be termed ‘back to the future.’ Once the Taliban’s hold is broken, the army will work with the maliks to restore the old tribal power structure. The maliks will get stipends for their ‘jirgas,’ or governing councils and for a network of sentries known as ‘khassadars.’ The maliks will also revive local militias that can defend against insurgents.:
He also discusses beefing up the Frontier Corps, who are getting training in 21st-century counterinsurgency training from about 80 U.S. Special Forces troops at bases nearby.
The GHQ attack has drawn accusations from several quarters in Pakistan that it was inspired by foreign powers; some have named India and the US among the usual suspects. Such ‘experts’ rarely bother to give any concrete evidence to substantiate their charges, which are based mainly on conjecture. They can only argue as to which country would want to hurt Pakistan the most: surely it must be India. Since many now see the US as the enemy, it too, in their view, could be the hidden hand behind the attack. In this particular case the leader of the terrorists has been captured alive. An army spokesman has identified him as Aqeel, alias Dr Usman, affiliated with terrorist outfits based in southern Punjab. The terrorists involved in the attack were apparently trained in South Waziristan.
LOL at Uzbeki’s being a main theme here! Because the Central Asians are really an impressive cultural group that I want to identify with, as opposed to those darky Tamils who win Nobel prizes for Science and stuff. LOL. Can Pakistan wake up and realize that India is not going to invade and wipe you out? I mean, my parents probably would want to do that, but current India is not led by my parents. C’mon, people, we’re not that different–the main mission here is to spread literacy and affluence, both in Pakistan and India. India is about to spend more billions on the latest US military technology–not really needed (well, maybe, against China?)–c’mon people, can we stop the waste of resources and be like the Chinese and trade to make some $$? Stop the hating (and sabre-rattling) on India and you will find young Indians willing and ready to do business with you post-Partition desis.
Ravi,
Am completely with you, I actually wrote a whole post about the need for Indo-Pak revival of back channel diplomacy: https://changinguppakistan.wordpress.com/2009/09/28/wading-in-the-back-channels-of-diplomacy/
From a regional point of view, peace talks with India is so important if we want the military to shift its attention to its eastern front.
While people-to-people diplomacy has certainly improved between our nations, the military has this entrenched mentality of India being the existential threat, and no matter how much it’s been attempted to be framed otherwise, it is unlikely this belief will change in the near future unless major breakthroughs are made.
Kalsoom, I can’t seem to reply directly under your reply to my comment, so posting it here.
FC – is already undergoing Spec Ops training and more at Tarbela. A few days back, I shared picture of a FC soldier on twitter, undergoing the training.
The ever dependable Kalsoom comes up with another concise summary of what is happening in Pakistan eliminating the need to follow the main stream media. Kudos.
-Aly
http://discomaulvi.wordpress.com/
Thanks Aly!
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Many in Pakistan fail to understand the value of their vote. Agreed we go to the polling stations whenever we are lucky enough to have elections, but having an ink mark on our thumb does not mark the end of our civic duty. When we come out in numbers, those politicians that take Pakistanis for granted are shaken to the core. Those law enforcement agencies carry out their duty with justice. Not only the government, but the army also realizes that it becomes powerless when it is dealing with the nation as one. If we, the people, are able to wield such influence over these powerful institutions by coming together as one unit, lord save the militants if we truly unite as Pakistan.
I strongly believe that the pashtun are not at fault here. This military offensive would go a waste. Partly because the recent attacks around the country are only being named on TTP. Yes, TTP was responsible and should be punsihed but not through military offensive but through other means.
The attacks after the offensive has started were not being done by TTP. If I were to attack at a house, it would go defensive and defend itself with all the resources it has by regrouping it’s members etc., and not have the time to go and attack my house.
The same is the case with TTP. Chalo maan liya before TTP as responsible, but now it isn’t. Now the attacks are being done by foreign elements to put fuel on the already burning fire. What would you call the american spying on the kahuta research labs recently.
I believe here that the american’s are forcing the paki’s to severe ties with one of the most strongest assets of pakistan — Pashtun. The next most strong asset is the Baluch tribes. Pashtun’s help Paki nation go stronger during the 1965 war. Baluch helped gain 90% of the kashmir we have today.
American’s are certainly well informed of our assets by India who wants to see a weak Pakistan, which could be easily conquered in the future. Yes, without Baluch’s and Pashtun and punjabi’s or sindhi’s are definitely weak.
Think Paki’s Think. We are being led astray. Foreign power is certainly meddling with us.
This military offensive would only make Pakistan weak. You can wait and watch for this.
[…] grounds. Targets vary from the military to foreigners to innocent school children. The army is fighting a war in the North against the Taliban. And amidst it all, where are our esteemed leaders? They are sitting in the parliament debating an […]